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Signaling Character in Electoral Competition
By NAVIN KARTIK AND R. PRESTON MCAFEE*
We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with
the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character” and are
exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters.
Character is desirable, and a voter’s utility is a convex combination of standard
policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate’s character. This structure
induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy
platform affects voters’ utilities not only directly, but also indirectly through
inferences about a candidate’s character. The model generates a number of pre-
dictions, starting with a failure of the median voter theorem. (JEL D72, D82)
Americans believe Mr. Bush himself hon-
estly believed Saddam was a threat ... [vot-
ers] can tell he is not doing it all by polls
and focus groups. ... You can agree or dis-
agree with him, but it is hard to doubt his
guts, his seriousness, and his commit-
ment. ... This is why in presidential elec-
tions character trumps everything.
—Wall Street Journal editorial,
April 22, 2004
Throughout the 2000 US presidential race,
spokespersons for the George W. Bush cam-
paign frequently alleged that opponent Al Gore
would “say anything to get elected.” The im-
plicit suggestion is that George Bush believed in
his position and would state it even if it hurt his
chances of being elected. The interesting prop-
osition the Bush campaign took is that voters
should vote against politicians who state only
popular positions, because such politicians lack
character.
The idea that politicians might lack character
is not new. Criticism of career politicians and
insiders has been a frequent refrain in political
campaigns. George Washington said, “Few men
have virtue to withstand the highest bidder.”
Calvin Coolidge said, “Character is the only
secure foundation of the state.” Barry Goldwa-
ter used character ineffectively against Lyndon
Johnson in 1964. In a series of television adver-
tisements, a spokesman said, “You must not
give power to a man unless, above everything
else, he has character. Character is the most
important qualification the president of the
United States can have.” It is a historical irony
that Goldwater’s spokesman for presidential
character was Richard Nixon.
The simple purpose of this paper is to inves-
tigate the effects of character—taken to be an
exogenous characteristic of people—on policy
selection and voting. The idea is that a politician
with character prescribes to voters the position
that the politician thinks is best. Politicians
without character tell voters whatever is most
likely to get the politician elected. Voters have
preferences over both positions and character.
Voters try to infer character from the positions
taken by candidates. Only the candidates with-
out character are strategic, because the candi-
dates with character state their exogenous best
position.
One immediate consequence of character is
that the median voter theorem cannot hold.1 To
see why, suppose that all politicians without
character choose the preferred position of the
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ideal policy as their platform.
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median voter. Then, even the slightest deviation
from that position will inform the voters that the
candidate has character, and hence insure the
election of the candidate, who would be a pol-
itician with character almost at the median. This
is by itself an important effect of character,
because while the median voter theorem is ro-
bust in many theoretical models (see, for exam-
ple, Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan 2005), it
does not appear to be an empirically salient
characteristic of many elections (e.g., Stephen
Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and
Charles Stewart III 2001).
The theory we develop produces a unique
equilibrium, in which candidates without char-
acter randomize. The distribution of their posi-
tions is related to the distribution of the
positions of candidates with character, with a
distortion toward the median. Thus, even
though the median voter theorem fails in its
strong form, policies are biased toward the cen-
ter. Most elections result in a tie; only extreme
candidates lose, and extremists are candidates
with character. Tied elections arise because can-
didates without character randomize, random-
ization entails indifference, and in the political
context, indifference entails ties.
Why do voters care about character? We ap-
peal to a standard answer given in the literature:
voters use it to partially assess the set of actions
a candidate may take if elected. Politicians can-
not commit to a full set of contingent actions,
and so voters are necessarily unsure what an
elected official will actually do once in office.
At most, the candidate can commit to a handful
of stated positions. As voters typically care
about subtle and sometimes unobservable be-
havior by an elected official, voters will also
care about attributes of the candidate beyond the
candidate’s stated policy dimension. Canonical
attributes of this kind are known as valence and
are familiar characteristics of political theory
(Donald E. Stokes 1963).2 The crucial feature of
valence characteristics is that they are monoton-
ically valued by all voters—more of the trait is
preferred to less—independent of ideological
position. It is this interpretation we take when
introducing our basic model. The novel aspect
of our approach is that the position chosen by
the candidate is interpreted by the voters as a
signal about character.
In the latter part of the paper, we discuss how
our analysis can be extended to cover a richer
set of voter preferences. In particular, this per-
mits voters with differing ideal policy positions
to value a candidate’s character differently.
Moreover, a voter’s preference for character can
vary with the stated position of the candidate.
This allows us to endogenize the preference for
character, stepping beyond mere valence inter-
pretations. Suppose that an elected official takes
actions of two kinds: observable or “in plain
view,” and unobservable or “out of sight.” Can-
didates can credibly commit to what observable
actions they will take because voters can punish
them should they not keep their promises; on
the other hand, unobservable actions cannot be
committed to, since voters cannot enforce such
promises. A politician who has character says
what he will actually do (on both dimensions),
whereas a politician without character may do
something very different on the unobservable
dimension from what he promised—and neces-
sarily lives up to—on the observable dimen-
sion. In this sense, it is natural to interpret
the character trait here as that of integrity.3
This setting generates an endogenous taste for
character among voters, which will depend both
on stated position of the candidate and a vot-
er’s own ideal position. Under some assump-
tions, our main insight extends to such an
environment.
Recent literature, such as Martin J. Osborne
and Al Slivinski (1996) and Timothy Besley
and Stephen Coate (1997), considers candidates
who cannot commit to positions at all. Lack of
commitment should tend to make candidate
character more important, strengthening the im-
plications of our analysis. Some commitment is
plausible, however, based on repeated game
arguments of Alberto Alesina (1988) and
Alesina and Stephen E. Spear (1988); empirical
2 Not all valence attributes are about character, however.
Although Stokes’s (1963) original discussion of valence
comports well with our notion here, more recent literature
sometimes uses the term valence to describe attributes such
as “handshaking ability,” charisma, and so forth. These
traits are not what we have in mind.
3 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of “integ-
rity” is “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or
artistic values.” Discussion of integrity often arises in pol-
itics and, in fact, the word was the most-researched word on
Merriam-Webster online by Americans in 2005 (CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/12/10/top.word.ap.ap/).
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support for commitment appears in Keith T.
Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997). One im-
plication of our analysis is that candidates who
change their position toward the median may
be perceived as lacking character, thus encour-
aging commitment to positions. Thus, in a
dynamic or repeated election context, the
possibility of character itself may enhance
commitment.
We formulate our model in the simplest pos-
sible structure: the standard one-dimensional
model of electoral competition following An-
thony Downs (1957), adapted from the spatial
model of Harold Hotelling (1929). Character
itself is taken to be an exogenous characteristic
of candidates. We think it is reasonable to con-
sider that character is formed long before indi-
viduals choose to enter politics, and that
character in the general population is in fact
exogenous. Character may, however, play a role
in the selection of candidates who run for office
(e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim and Kartik 2004),
and a weakness of our analysis is that the pro-
cess generating candidates is not modeled. In
defense, we analyze the subgame of platform
selection given an arbitrary candidate selection
mechanism, and analysis of the subgame is nec-
essary to investigate a more general model.
We find that the posterior probability that a
candidate has character is higher the further the
candidate is from the ideal position of the me-
dian voter. This is the feature of the equilibrium
that leads to voter indifference. Voters think
extremists usually mean what they say, while
middle-of-the-road candidates are more likely
simply to have said what voters want to hear.
The beliefs are constructed to create indiffer-
ence among candidates without character. A
useful aspect of this construction is that it leads
to a closed form for the density of positions of
candidates without character, up to a single pa-
rameter that must be implicitly constructed.
This construction would aid an attempt at em-
pirical analysis, although the problems of quan-
tifying the position space and beliefs about
character necessary for empirical testing are
daunting, indeed.
As the proportion of candidates with charac-
ter diminishes to zero, the equilibrium platform
distribution of those without character collapses
on the median voter’s ideal point. The support
of these positions, however, does not collapse.
Interestingly, if almost all candidates have char-
acter, both the distribution and support of posi-
tions of candidates without character also
collapses to the median. Thus, while there is a
sense in which the median voter theorem holds
at either extreme of the model, the mere pres-
ence of character has an echo on policy plat-
forms even when it is very unlikely.
An important feature of the equilibrium of
our model is that it is an ex post equilibrium,
which means that even after the candidates see
each other’s position, they do not regret their
choice. Thus, it does not matter if the game is
played sequentially or simultaneously, as the
predicted behavior is invariant to timing. We
find this a particularly appealing aspect of our
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The theory presented here provides a theoret-
ical but intuitive grounding for a mechanism
that is often believed to operate in real elections.
As the opening quote from the Wall Street Jour-
nal suggests, the perception of not pandering to
the public can be valuable to a politician. This
provides a novel explanation of why candidates
may select nonmedian platforms and, moreover,
why voters may vote for such candidates, rather
than simply selecting a centrist candidate. Ap-
plications of this principle abound. For exam-
ple, it is widely agreed that in the 2004 US
presidential election, George W. Bush won de-
spite choosing a platform that was well to the
right of the center. His victory is often attributed
to a belief among the public of his “conviction”
in his policy position, in contrast to the percep-
tion of John Kerry. This is consistent with our
theory. Moreover, the model delivers this as
rational behavior and, in particular, rational in-
ferences by the public. However, our theory
also makes the following point: the noncentrist
candidate may not truly possess the desirable
character trait; he could, in fact, be a strategic
politician mimicking the behavior of those with
character.
As another example, consider the case of the
Flemish Liberal Party (VLD) in Belgium.4 In
1994, the VLD committed to propose as its
platform the policy preferred by the majority of
the Belgian public, which it elicited through a
public poll. It lost the election by a large margin
to a less centrist party. In 1999, on the other
4 We owe this example to Juan D. Carrillo and Micael
Castanheira (2002).
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hand, the VLD did not pursue this approach,
and instead proposed a less centrist platform
without the same kind of public poll. It won the
election, beating more centrist parties. Why?
The explanation here is that in simply pandering
to the median voter in 1994, the VLD leaders
signaled a lack of character. In contrast, in
1999, despite not being as desirable purely on
the platform dimension, the new leaders of the
VLD signaled that they would choose policies
that they believed were best, and this trait was
valued by voters. Needless to say, this should be
viewed as just one component in explaining the
reversal in the VLD’s fortunes.
As a final example, we recall a well-publicized
statement made by senator John McCain during
a 1999 Republican primary debate in Iowa:
“I’m here to tell you the things that you don’t
want to hear.” McCain went on to denounce
ethanol subsidies, which are widely popular in
Iowa. From the perspective of appealing to vot-
ers on policy alone, this is perhaps puzzling; in
fact, all the other Republican candidates either
supported or expressed neutrality on this issue.
When a campaign is interpreted as also signal-
ing character, however, McCain’s approach is
straightforward to interpret. The quoted state-
ment prefacing his position suggests that his
goal was to convince voters that he would not
merely choose platforms that appeal to them,
but instead would choose platforms that he truly
believed in—and that such a trait should be
appreciated by voters.
There are other papers in the literature that
derive policy divergence results, starting with
Randall Calvert (1985) and Donald Wittman
(1977). The closest in spirit to ours is the inde-
pendent and earlier work of Steven Callander
(2005) and Callander and Simon Wilkie (2005).
Callander (2005) presumes that voters value a
trait about politicians that is unobservable but
may be signaled in their campaign platform,
with the specific trait being effort devoted to
policy implementation. The campaign platform
is a commitment, whereas effort cannot be com-
mitted to. Unlike our model with character, all
candidates in his model are fully strategic; they
differ only in whether they are policy-motivated
and exert high effort if elected, or office-motivated
and exert low effort if elected. Callander and
Wilkie (2005) study a model where there is no
commitment to policy (and no issue of effort
exerted in office), so that every candidate will
implement his ideal position if elected. Candi-
dates, however, can be one of two types: either
they suffer a zero disutility from lying about
their preferred position, or they suffer some
finite cost of lying (as in Banks 1990), which
increases with the magnitude of their lie.
While there are obvious similarities in moti-
vation and the results derived here with both
Callander (2005) and Callander and Wilkie
(2005),5 there are important distinctions. The
most significant difference is that because can-
didates with character in our model are not
strategic about their platform choice (or, alter-
natively, suffer an infinite disutility from lying),
our main result is a unique equilibrium charac-
terization. In contrast, belief-based refinements
of signaling equilibria play a role in both Cal-
lander (2005) and Callander and Wilkie (2005).
Moreover, as noted above, Callander and
Wilkie (2005) assume a lack of policy commit-
ment. Our focus here is on a setting with com-
mitment, although we show how some of
central insights can be extended to the case
without commitment. In Callander (2005),
candidates have preference over final policy
outcomes and not directly over campaign plat-
forms, whereas our candidates with character
can be interpreted as having direct preferences
over platforms. Thus, we believe our notion
corresponds more closely to the familiar sense
of character. We elaborate on this point after
introducing the model.
The impact of valence on policy platforms
was formally studied by Ansolabehere and Sny-
der (2000), Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas R.
Palfrey (2002), and Timothy Groseclose (2001).
In a related vein, John Londregan and Thomas
Romer (1993) study an incumbency advantage
model where an incumbent has a valence ad-
vantage of “ability” over challengers. These pa-
pers take a candidate’s valence attribute as
observable; hence there is no signaling element.
Policy divergence stems from asymmetry of
valence across candidates. Our divergence
5 In particular, both Callander (2005) and Callander and
Wilkie (2005) obtain some results with the following prop-
erties: (a) the median voter may not vote for the closest
candidate; (b) the less desirable type of politicians play a
mixed strategy allocating greater weight on more central
positions; (c) the median voter is indifferent over (most)
platforms; and (d) more extreme candidates are perceived
with increasing probability to be the more preferred type.
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result arises even when candidates are com-
pletely ex ante symmetric.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
We present the basic model in Section I. In
Section II, we derive the unique equilibrium and
develop a number of its implications. Section III
studies the impact of character in a two-stage
electoral process: party primaries followed by a
general election. We briefly discuss some ex-
tensions in Section IV, although the details of
these extensions are presented separately in an
online Appendix (available at http://www.e-aer.
org/data/june07/20060106_app.pdf). Section V
concludes and provides some directions for fu-
ture research. Formal proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
I. The Model
The basic element of the model is a standard
Hotelling-Downs one-dimensional policy loca-
tion game. The set of policies is denoted X  [0,
1]. There is a continuum of voters (synonymous
with citizens), each with single-peaked policy
preferences on X. A voter is identified by her
ideal point,6 v  X, and we assume that her
policy preferences can be represented by a util-
ity function u(x, v) that is twice continuously
differentiable, and satisfies u1(v, v)  0 and
u12(x, v)  0 for all x.7 The median ideal point
among voters is m(0,1). There are two candi-
dates (synonymous with politicians), A and B,
each of whom must commit to a platform, xi 
X. After observing both candidates’ platforms,
each voter votes sincerely to maximize her ex-
pected utility.8 The candidate with greater vote
share wins the election; ties are resolved by a
fair coin toss.
We now depart from the standard model by
introducing character as follows. Character is a
binary variable: candidate i  {A, B} either
possesses it (ci  1) or does not (ci  0). This
is private information and drawn independently
from a Bernoulli distribution with Pr(ci  1) 
b  0. If a candidate i has character, his plat-
form choice, xi , is constrained to be the draw of
a random variable that has a differentiable cu-
mulative distribution function F with density
f(x)  0 for all x  X.9 Hence, a candidate with
character has no strategic choice to make, and
we refer to such types as nonstrategic types. On
the other hand, candidates without character
care only about holding office, and hence stra-
tegically choose their platform to maximize
their probability of being elected.
Voters care about character in addition to
policy: a voter v’s expected utility from a can-
didate i with platform xi is denoted U(xi, v),
where
Uxi, v   Prci  1xi uxi, v.
Thus,   0 is the relative weight voters
attach to a politician’s character. Note that the
inference about a politician’s character depends
upon his chosen platform. The standard Hotelling-
Downs model is a special case of our model
when either b  0 or   0.
Some remarks are in order about our model-
ing choices, and further literature connections.
First, candidates without character in our model
are purely office-motivated and fully strategic.
Formally, candidates with character are nonstra-
tegic and can be thought of as “crazy” types,
following David M. Kreps et al. (1982). This
interpretation is strained, however, and we pre-
fer to think of them as fully rational, despite our
choice of terminology. The idea is that can-
didates with character suffer (infinite) disutil-
ity from proposing a platform they do not
“believe in.” This notion has similarities with
what John E. Roemer (1999) calls militant
motivation. As discussed in the introduction,
our assumption that citizens care about a pol-
6 Throughout, we use female pronouns for voters and
male pronouns for candidates.
7 This represents single-peaked preferences because for
any x  v,
uv, v  ux, v  
x
v
u1 z, v  u1 z, z dz
 
x
v 
z
v
u12 z, y dy dz  0.
8 Sincere voting is fully rational in this setting. It serves
only to eliminate trivial outcomes such as all voters voting
for one candidate, and no voter deviating because each
individual is powerless to change the outcome.
9 The assumption that F has full support is not crucial.
Our analysis extends to arbitrary distributions; failure of the
median voter theorem (Corollary 1) requires only that the
support of F includes an interval containing the median, m.
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itician’s character is meant to capture the idea
that citizens not only have policy preferences
over the campaign issues, but also care about
some unobservable characteristic of politi-
cians which is correlated with their willing-
ness to pander in order to gain office. Indeed,
our model can be thought of as a reduced
form for the following: each candidate i has a
policy, pi, drawn from the cdf F, that he
thinks is “right.” He then learns whether he
has character, in which case he necessarily
chooses platform xi  pi, perhaps due to a
preference for not pandering. If he does not
have character, he strategically chooses plat-
form xi to maximize his probability of being
elected. Now, suppose character types will re-
sist special interest groups if elected, whereas
noncharacter or flexible types will fall prey to
them. Voters get a disutility of  from an elected
politician who deals with special interest groups.
In this environment, a voter has an instrumental
reason to prefer politicians who are nonstrategi-
cally choosing their platform, all else equal.
The candidates with character in our model
are not policy-motivated in the usual sense the
term is used (Calvert 1985; Wittman 1977). The
utility for policy-motivated candidates depends
on the final policy outcome and not directly on
their individual policy platform, whereas candi-
dates with character in our model care directly
about the platform they propose, regardless of
the final policy outcome. In a sense, character
candidates are procedurally motivated. To take
another perspective, policy-motivated candi-
dates have unlimited ability to compromise in
platform, and will do so if it results in a more
desirable final policy outcome; character candi-
dates are limited in their ability to compromise on
their platform. Morris P. Fiorina (1999, 9, fn. 10)
makes this distinction.
We have assumed that the prior probability of
having character and the distribution of plat-
forms conditional on character is the same
across both candidates. Thus, there is no ex ante
asymmetry between the candidates. This con-
trasts with the literature on observable valence
asymmetry (e.g., Aragones and Palfrey 2002).
In Section IV, we discuss ex ante differences
between the candidates.
Since candidates with character are nonstra-
tegic, we refer to a candidate’s strategy as his
behavioral rule conditional on not having char-
acter, i.e., conditional on being strategic. A
strategy for candidate i  {A, B} is represented
by a cumulative distribution function (cdf), Gi.
If Gi has a density, we denote it gi. As this is a
signaling game, voter beliefs about a candi-
date’s character are critical. Let i(x) be the
posterior probability that i has character given
his platform choice of x.
It is convenient to define (x)  u(x, m), so
that (x) is the median voter’s policy utility
from platform x. Given the posterior belief of
character and the platform of candidate i, the
median voter’s expected utility should this can-
didate be elected is
ixi  ix  x.
Where there is no risk of confusion, we typ-
ically suppress the dependence of i on i to
reduce notation. Sincere voting implies that
candidate i wins and candidate j  i loses if
i(xi)  j(xj). When the two expressions are
equal, the election is tied, and each candidate
gets elected with probability 1⁄2 . Given the be-
liefs A and B, voter behavior is completely
pinned down (except perhaps for a measure 0
set of voters), hence we are not explicit about it
in what follows.
Our solution concept is that of (weak) perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (Drew Fudenberg and
Jean Tirole 1991). This requires that the plat-
form distributions, GA and GB, respectively,
maximize the probability of being elected for
each strategic candidate given voter beliefs A
and B, and that A and B be consistent with
Bayes’s Rule.10 For technical convenience, we
restrict attention to equilibria where the distri-
butions GA and GB can be written as the sum of
absolutely continuous and discrete distributions.11
II. Signaling Character
A. The Unique Equilibrium
Due to the symmetry in the model, a candi-
date must win with positive probability if stra-
tegic. To see this, observe that a candidate can
10 More precisely, each i must be a regular conditional
distribution derived from the distributional strategy (Paul R.
Milgrom and Robert J. Weber 1985) induced by F and Gi.
11 By the Lebesgue decomposition theorem for the Real
line, this is only a restriction in precluding a strategy from
having a singular component without mass points.
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always play the same strategy as his opponent.
If he does so, he loses with probability one only if
voters believe that, for all platforms in the support
of this strategy, he is less likely to have character
than his opponent. Given that both candidates
have the same prior likelihood of character, b 0,
and the same distribution over platforms with
character, F, this cannot be the case.
The only way that strategic candidates win
with positive probability, and yet maximize
their probability of winning, is if every platform
that they choose offers the same value to the
median voter (and all platforms not chosen offer
no greater value). Call this value *. Since there
are no mass points in the platforms of the can-
didates with character, strategic candidates will
not use mass points either. To see this, note that
the Bayes’s update on the probability a candi-
date has character is zero at any mass point in
the strategy of the strategic candidates. Thus, at
any mass point in the strategy, there is a choice
for the strategic candidate with a nearby policy
platform, but a positive likelihood of having
character. Consequently, the distribution of po-
sitions chosen by the candidates will be contin-
uous. This means that we can write the Bayes’s
update as
ix 
bfx
bfx  1  bgix .
Since within the support of their strategies,
both strategic candidates offer value *, we
conclude that
(1) *  x   bfxbfx 1 bgix .
The equation above states that for any posi-
tion that may be taken by a strategic candidate,
the utility offered to the median voter is a con-
stant. Recall that this utility is the sum of the
position’s direct value to the median voter and
the Bayes’s updated beliefs about the candi-
date’s likely character. Equation (1) can be
solved for the density of platform choices,
which turns out to be
(2) gix  g*x
 max0, bf(x)1 b  *(x) 1.
This is a symmetric expression, so the plat-
form distribution is the same for both strategic
candidates. Moreover, the value of * is deter-
mined by the requirement that g* be a density,
and hence integrate to one. It is readily shown
that (m) 	 * 	 (m) 
 , since a candidate
can always offer a value of at least (m) by
choosing platform m, and can offer a value of
no greater than (m) 
 .
An important aspect of this construction is
that the median voter is indifferent over every
position taken by strategic candidates. Thus,
even knowing the opponent’s platform, a stra-
tegic candidate has no incentive to revise his
position. This property means that the equilib-
rium is an ex post equilibrium, and in this set-
ting, it has two important implications. First, the
outcome is not sensitive to the timing of the
game: the same behavior remains an equilib-
rium whether one candidate announces first, or
second, or both announce platforms simulta-
neously. Second, all elections between strategic
candidates result in a tie, even though candi-
dates have distinct positions.
It turns out that, with substantially more
work, it can be shown that this equilibrium is
unique. This conclusion is summarized in The-
orem 1, the formal proof of which is in the
Appendix.
THEOREM 1: There is a unique equilibrium.
It is an ex post equilibrium where both candi-
dates use the same strategy, G*, with density
g* x  max0, bf(x)1 b  *(x) 1,
where *  ((m), (m) 
 ) is the unique
constant such that x g*(x) dx  1.
Therefore, both candidates mix in equilib-
rium, using a continuous density. Our interpre-
tation of mixed strategies follows the Bayesian
view of opponents’ conjectures, originating in
John C. Harsanyi (1973). That is, a candidate’s
mixed strategy need not represent him literally
randomizing over platforms; instead, it repre-
sents the uncertainty that the other candidate
and the electorate have about his pure strategy
choice. Each candidate could be playing a pure
strategy which depends upon an auxiliary vari-
able that is his private information.
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One implication of Theorem 1 that is worth
emphasizing is that the median voter theorem
(MVT) does not hold in our model. Note that in
the current setting, the appropriate version of
the MVT is that, ex ante, each candidate
chooses platform m with probability 1  b  0,
viz., with the probability of being strategic.
COROLLARY 1: The MVT fails. In the unique
equilibrium, the ex-ante probability that either
candidate chooses platform m is 0.
B. Properties
We now derive various implications of The-
orem 1. The first is a simple observation.
FACT 1: If a candidate is strategic, he wins
with probability at least as large as if he had
character.
This is an immediate consequence of the fact
that a strategic candidate provides the median
voter with utility *, whereas a candidate with
character provides the same utility if his plat-
form falls within the support of the equilibrium
strategy, G*, and strictly less utility if his plat-
form falls outside the support.
Since * is the expected utility of the median
voter, comparative statics on * immediately
become comparative statics on the utility of the
median voter. The comparative statics on * are
readily computed from the equation
(3) 
x
max 0, bf(x)1 b
	  *(b, f, , )(x) 1 dx 1,
which implicitly defines * as a function of b, f,
, and . We use this and the equilibrium con-
struction from the previous section to discuss
various implications of our theory. Denote by
*(x) the posterior held by voters upon seeing
platform x in equilibrium.
FACT 2: The posterior belief on character is
single-troughed around the median. That is,
*(x) is strictly decreasing for x 	 m, and
strictly increasing for x  m, whereas g*(x)/
f(x) is strictly increasing for x 	 m, and strictly
decreasing for x  m.
This property of g*(x)/f(x) is immediate from
inspection of (2), because  is single-peaked
around m. That the reverse is true for * then
follows because we can write the Bayes’s up-
date as
*x 
b
b  1  b
g*x
fx
.
Thus, strategic candidates skew their positions
toward the median voter’s preferred position.
Moreover, voters believe that candidates near
the median voter’s preferred policy are less
likely to have character, and the farther away
the chosen position is, the more likely the can-
didate is to have character. This leaves the me-
dian voter indifferent, provided the positions are
in the support of g*. Outside the support of g*,
the voters are certain the candidate has character
but the candidate loses nonetheless, because the
advantage of assured character is unable to
overcome the disadvantage of an extreme posi-
tion. Thus, the model accommodates extreme
positions losing with certainty and distinct mod-
erate positions resulting in ties.
FACT 3: The median voter’s utility from a
strategic candidate, *, is increasing in the
value of character, , and the probability of
character, b.
This directly follows from inspection of (3).
That ex ante welfare, *, increases in b is rel-
atively trivial, since voters value character, and
b is the ex ante probability of a candidate having
character. The rationale behind * increasing in
the weight placed on character, , is more sub-
tle. As  rises, g*(x)/f(x) flattens out, and stra-
tegic candidates look more like candidates with
character. This casts the effect of  on utility in
an interesting light. The flattening of g*(x)/f(x)
means that the value of the platform offered by
strategic candidates falls as  rises. Moreover,
the likelihood that a candidate has character
hasn’t changed. Thus, the value offered by stra-
tegic candidates falls and their prevalence re-
mains unchanged. The behavior and prevalence
of candidates with character hasn’t changed.
Thus, the overall value of the system seems to
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have fallen. The apparent paradox is resolved
by noting that the total value of the candidates
with character has risen because character is
valued more highly.
FACT 4: The support of a strategic candi-
date’s choices is increasing in the value of
character, .
By (2), the support of g* is given by the
solutions to  
 (x) 
 *. Thus, whether the
support increases in  reduces to the question of
whether (*/) 	 1. This is indeed the case,
since by differentiating (3), we see that

x
x
*
bfx
1  b
1
*  x2
	 *  (x)   *  dx  0.
Since *   
 (x) for all x in the support
of g*, the equality above cannot hold unless
(*/) 	 1. Thus, the support of g* is indeed
increasing in . This means that as character
becomes more important, the likelihood of ex-
tremists, with and without character, being
elected rises. The intuition is that when policy
becomes less important relative to character,
candidates with extreme platforms can still win.
If character is sufficiently important, so that is 
is sufficiently large, g* will have full support. In
this case, any election is tied.
FACT 5: As utility from character becomes
infinitely more important than direct policy util-
ity, strategic candidates perfectly mimic the dis-
tribution of candidates with character. That is,
as  3 , g*(x) 3 f(x) for all x.
We defer the argument to the Appendix. In-
tuitively, as the weight on character diverges,
the gain from being perceived as having char-
acter increases for each candidate. Thus, in the
limit, strategic candidates fully mimic the dis-
tribution of those with character.
Another comparative static considers a
change in the platform of candidates with char-
acter. Suppose that f is replaced with h, and that
h(x)  f(x) is increasing for x 	 m, and de-
creasing for x  m. That is, candidates with
character are more likely to come from the
center under h than under f. In this case, we say
that h is a more central density than f.
FACT 6: The median voter’s utility from a
strategic candidate, *, is higher when the dis-
tribution of platforms from a candidate with
character comes from a more central density.
The proof is in the Appendix. The idea is
simple: strategic candidates mimic the distribu-
tion of those with character, but skew their play
toward the median voter’s preferred policy. If
the distribution of platforms of candidates of
character is more concentrated toward the cen-
ter, then both strategic and nonstrategic candi-
dates’ play becomes more desirable to the
median voter in policy terms. Thus, * goes up.
For our last comparative statics, we consider
the limits as b converges to 0 or 1.
FACT 7: As b3 1, Supp(g*)3 {m}. As b3
0, Supp(g*) 3 {x(x) 
  
 (m)}, but G*
converges to an atom on m.
The proof is in the Appendix. If most candi-
dates have character, so that b is close to one,
there is little advantage to a strategic candidate
of signaling character by position, since the
prior is so strong. Consequently, the support of
the distribution of the strategic candidate’s strat-
egy collapses to m. This case replicates the
standard model and the MVT emerges at this
limit. In contrast, if there are few candidates
with character, and b is close to zero, the dis-
tribution collapses on m but the support of the
distribution converges to the set {x(x) 
  

(m)}. This is as large as the support can get for
a given . Thus, while almost all strategic can-
didates locate very near the middle, the possi-
bility of strategic candidates a long way from
the middle remains in the limit as candidates
without character vanish. The possibility of can-
didates with character then has an echo in the
model, even when the probability of such can-
didates goes to zero. Note that in such a case, ex
post, an elected candidate may have a position
far from the middle.
III. Two-Stage Elections
In many electoral systems, such as the US
presidential process, a candidate must win a
party nomination before competing in a general
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election. To a first approximation, a party nom-
ination is won by garnering the majority of
votes among the subset of all voters who are
affiliated with the party.12 This implies that the
set of voters a candidate must appeal to is dif-
ferent in the within-party primary vote (first
stage) from the general election vote (second
stage). For instance, in the United States, the
median voter in the Republican (respectively,
Democratic) party’s primary is to the right (left)
of the median voter in the general election. To
date, there has been a relative paucity of theo-
retical work on electoral outcomes in such set-
tings.13 In this section, we study a simplified
version of our model extended to a two-stage
electoral process. Rather than presenting an ex-
haustive analysis, our goal is to suggest only
how our central theme can be extended to such
settings, with interesting implications.
For tractability, we simplify the policy space
to the discrete set X  {1, 0, 1}. There are two
political parties, denoted L and R. Within each
party, there are two candidates for office. The
winner of the election is decided through a
two-stage process. In the first stage, the primary
election, each candidate from each party starts
by simultaneously committing to a policy posi-
tion that is either 0 or his own party’s extreme
policy: 1 for party R and 1 for party L. Then,
each party determines its nominee through a
vote between its two candidates by the citizens
affiliated with the party. In the second stage, the
general election, all citizens get to vote for one
of the two nominees (one nominee from each
party); the winner of this general election is
elected to office and implements the policy to
which he committed in the first stage. That is,
candidates are committed to the same platform
in the general election as they chose in their
party primary.
As usual, denote a voter’s policy utility by
u(x, v), where x is the policy and v is her ideal
point. For convenience, assume there is a dis-
tinct, single (and thus median) voter in each of
the three elections: the two party primaries and
the general election.14 The voter in party L’s
primary has ideal point 1, the voter in party
R’s primary has ideal point 1, and the voter in
the general election has ideal point 0. Further-
more, we restrict attention to a symmetric setup
across parties and policies such that u(1, 0) 
u(1, 0) 	 u(0, 0), u(0, 1)  u(0, 1), u(1,
1)  u(1, 1), and u(1, 1)  u(1, 1). If a
candidate has character, then any voter gets an
added utility of   0 if that candidate is
elected. Each candidate has probability b  (0,
1) of having character; those with character are
committed to an exogenously drawn platform.
A candidate with character from the R party
draws his platform from a distribution that
places probability f0  0 on platform 0 and
probability f1  1  f0  0 on platform 1.
Symmetrically, a candidate with character from
the L party chooses platform 0 with probability
f0 and platform 1 with probability f1  1 f0. Candidates without character aim to maxi-
mize their probability of being elected to office
(i.e., winning the general election).
A key feature of the setting we have de-
scribed is that, ceteris paribus, an extreme can-
didate is preferred in the party primaries,
whereas a centrist candidate is preferred in the
general election. We assume, however, that pri-
mary voters are forward-looking insofar as they
don’t myopically vote for the candidate they
prefer in the primary; rather, they take into
account the prospects of each candidate in the
general election. That is, voters in the primaries
vote for the candidate who maximizes their
overall expected utility, which depends only on
the general election winner’s platform and char-
acter. In particular, the primary median of each
party would prefer a centrist (from either party)
over an extremist from the other party, character
considerations aside.
We seek symmetric equilibria where strategic
candidates from party R (L) play platform 0
with probability g0 and platform 1 (1) with
probability g1  1  g0 (g1  1  g0). By
Bayes’s rule, the belief about character as function
of platform, (x), is the same for all candidates
in a symmetric equilibrium, and is given by
(x)  [bfx/bfx 
 (1  b)gx] for x  1, 0, 1.12 Strictly speaking, this is true only for so-called
“closed” primaries.
13 A recent exception is Adam Meirowitz (2005), al-
though his focus is quite different from ours. Elisabeth R.
Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton (1998) discuss the impact of
“closed” versus “open” primaries, and provide a good ref-
erence to some of the earlier formal literature.
14 This can be interpreted as representing median voters
among a large set of voters in each election, with one caveat
in footnote 16.
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Even within this simple setting, a variety of
symmetric equilibria can emerge, sometimes for
the same set of parameters. The reason for mul-
tiplicity is a kind of “self-fulling prophecy”
across primaries and the general election. The
candidate-generation process during the prima-
ries influences the success rate during the gen-
eral election: extreme candidates who emerge
from the primary are less likely to do well in the
general election, all else equal. The potential for
success in the general election, however, influ-
ences the voter preferences in the primary: if a
candidate with a particular platform is believed
to be more likely to win the general election,
that candidate is preferred in the primary.
Three kinds of equilibria are of particular
interest. The first kind, Naive Policy Preference
equilibrium, has the property that in the general
election, centrists are preferred over extremists,
whereas in the party primaries, extremists are
preferred over centrists.15 In the second kind,
General Election Indifference equilibrium, the
general election voter is indifferent between
centrists and extremists (and randomizes in vot-
ing), whereas in the party primaries, extremists
are preferred over centrists. Finally, in the third
kind, Centrist Dominant equilibrium, both gen-
eral election and primary voters prefer centrists
over extremists.
The following result shows that under some
conditions, Naive Policy Preference and Gen-
eral Election Indifference equilibria exist,
whereas Centrist Dominant equilibrium does
not. We say that u is convex if 2u(0, 1) 	 u(1,
1) 
 u(1, 1), i.e., the party voters prefer a
uniform lottery among the two extreme policies
over the certain center policy.
THEOREM 2: In the two-stage election model,
assume u is convex. Then, Centrist Dominant
equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, Naive
Policy Preference and General Election Indif-
ference equilibria exist for (possibly distinct) open
parameter sets of positive Lebesgue measure.
In both the Naive Policy Preference equilib-
rium and the General Election Indifference
equilibrium we construct, strategic candidates
randomize between their own party’s extreme
platform and the center platform. It is important
to note that in the General Election Indifference
equilibrium, even though the general election
voter is indifferent across all candidates, her
indifference cannot be broken by randomizing
uniformly across centrists and extremists. In-
stead, since extremists defeat centrists in the
party primary, the probability that a centrist
beats an extremist in the general election needs
to be such that strategic candidates are indeed
indifferent between choosing extreme and cen-
ter platforms at the outset.16
Theorem 2 reveals that character can have a
powerful effect in two-stage elections, because
character permits a General Election Indiffer-
ence equilibrium to exist for some parameters.
In contrast, when b  0, such an equilibrium
does not exist, because without character, the
general election voter is never indifferent be-
tween centrist and extreme candidates.17 The
indifference when b  0 arises precisely be-
cause even though the general election voter
prefers centrist platforms over extreme ones in
direct policy utility, the behavior of strategic
candidates is biased toward the center, so that
extremists are more likely to have character. In
this sense, the General Election Indifference
equilibrium captures and extends the main in-
sight of our earlier analysis.
IV. Discussion
We now briefly discuss a few extensions of our
theory, with regards to the basic model developed
in Section I for one-stage elections. Details and
formal results are available in the working paper
version of this article, and in the Supplementary
15 Note that regardless of how strategically candidates
behave, there is always positive probability that both can-
didates in a party’s primary have centrist or extreme plat-
forms. Thus, in the general election, there is positive
probability on all possible platform pairs by the two nom-
inated candidates.
16 With the assumed single voter in the general election,
this presents no conceptual issue. If, instead, this were a
median voter representing a large number of voters with
heterogeneous ideal points, we take the interpretation that
the nonuniform tie-breaking results from uncertainty about
the median that is resolved between the primary and general
election.
17 When b  0, a Centrist Dominant equilibrium always
exists. If b  0 and u is convex, however, this equilibrium
entails each party primary voter playing a weakly domi-
nated strategy, whereas a Naive Policy Preference equilib-
rium exists in undominated strategies.
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Appendix on the AEA Web site (http://www.
e-aer.org/data/june07/20060106_app.pdf).
A. Tied Elections
As already noted, our simple model results in
all elections between strategic candidates being
tied. Moreover, if the weight on character, , is
large enough, then all elections end in ties. This
feature can be mitigated by introducing uncer-
tainty about the median voter’s location that
gets resolved only after the candidates choose
platforms. So long as candidates do not possess
private information about the median voter’s
location, it is straightforward to extend our
analysis.
B. Ex Ante Asymmetry
Suppose that the prior likelihood of having
character can differ across candidates and,
moreover, the distribution of policies condi-
tional on character can also differ. This may be
appealing when thinking of candidates as rep-
resenting different political parties, for exam-
ple. A generalized version of Theorem 1 applies
in such an ex ante asymmetric setting. In par-
ticular, there is an ex post equilibrium with
candidate-specific strategies analogous to equa-
tion (2). It is important to note, however, that ex
ante asymmetries can endow one candidate with
an advantage resulting in his winning with prob-
ability one when strategic. The intuition is
related to models with observable valence
asymmetries (Aragones and Palfrey 2002;
Groseclose 2001).
C. Richer and Endogenous Preferences for
Character
We have modeled the preference for charac-
ter as being uniform across all voters and inde-
pendent of the policy platform, thus represented
by a constant . Our analysis can be extended
under some conditions, however, to a setting
where the preference weight on character de-
pends on both the platform and a voter’s per-
sonal ideal point. That is, utility for a voter with
ideal point v facing a candidate i with policy xi
may be given by U(xi , v)  (xi, v)Pr(ci 
1xi) 
 u(xi, v). One motivation for such a
specification is to capture the idea that politi-
cians take actions of two kinds: observable, or
“in plain view,” and unobservable, or “out of
sight.” The u(, ) component of a voter’s utility
represents the utility over observable actions
that have been committed to by the politician
during the electoral process. The (, ) compo-
nent represents the voter’s utility over the un-
observable actions that the politician will take in
office. If the politician has character, his posi-
tion on the unobservable dimension will be the
same as what he committed to on the observable
action, since those with character say what they
will actually do. If he does not have character,
however, he might do something very different
on the unobservable dimension from what he
promised (and necessarily lives up to) on the
observable dimension. In this setting, it is nat-
ural that the preference for character depends on
a candidate’s policy position and a voter’s ideal
point. For example, a voter with ideal point v 
1 may prefer a candidate with platform xi  0
not to have character and thus likely do some-
thing quite different on the unobservable di-
mension from what was promised. On the
other hand, the same voter may prefer a can-
didate with xi  1 to in fact have character,
thus guaranteeing that he will take the same
policy position on the unobservable dimen-
sion. This preference ordering over character
can be reversed for a voter with ideal point
v  0.
D. No Commitment
Finally, suppose that campaign statements
are pure cheap talk. If elected, a politician need
not necessarily implement his campaign plat-
form, and can instead choose any policy in the
policy space. The policy a candidate will actu-
ally implement if elected is private information,
and drawn from the density f(x). A candidate
also has character with probability b; this, too, is
private information. Candidates with character
announce precisely what they will do if elected,
whereas candidates without character will say
anything to get elected. Voters have preferences
only over final policy, u(x, v), and not directly
over character at all. Our main result can be
extended to such a setting, under some condi-
tions on the primitives. Character becomes en-
dogenously desirable here because a voter with
ideal point v would most prefer a candidate who
not only proposes platform v but also does so
with character.
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V. Conclusion
In a president, character is everything.
—Peggy Noonan
This paper develops a theory of character in
elections. The two key assumptions we make
are that some candidates may have character
and do not strategically choose policy platforms
simply to maximize the probability of getting
elected, and voters value character in addition to
campaign promises. Character quashes the me-
dian voter theorem, as strategic candidates pre-
tend to have the positions of candidates with
character. Elections between strategic candi-
dates are tied in the symmetric version of our
model. As character becomes more important to
voters, the behavior of strategic candidates
shifts farther away from the ideal policy of the
median voter and closer to the behavior of can-
didates with character.
We have illustrated a number of extensions of
the basic idea. In discussing extensions to richer
preferences, we sketched a model of endoge-
nous preference for character, where character
entails following the promised policy in all cir-
cumstances, even when the choice is unobserv-
able to voters. Voters who care about the
unmonitored behavior will naturally care about
the character of candidates. Our treatment of
this setting is very stylized, however, and it
would be useful to model this in a more detailed
way. We also believe that the model of two-
stage elections developed here is worthy of fur-
ther study in its own right.
An interesting avenue for future research
would be to consider the impact of character
when a politician makes repeated choices while
holding office. If there is a stochastic element
over time to the location of the median voter,
then the presence of candidates with character
may induce rigidity or stability of position, even
among candidates without character, for strate-
gic reasons. Thus, even purely office-motivated
candidates may appear to be driven by ideology
(cf. Joseph E. Harrington 1998). This is intrigu-
ing given the empirical evidence on the ideo-
logical consistency of elected officials (e.g.,
Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
A related issue is that we have modeled the
proportion of candidates possessing character as
an exogenous parameter, but in fact candidates
usually run for higher office only after a com-
plex winnowing process that includes serving
for lower offices. Does this process tend to
favor candidates with character or strategic can-
didates? In our model, the probability that a
candidate with character is elected is no more,
and may be strictly less, than the probability
that a strategic candidate is elected (see Fact 1).
This suggests that the winnowing process may
favor strategic candidates. If, however, candi-
dates with character are more likely to be re-
elected or advance to higher office—perhaps
because a candidate’s type may be discovered
with some probability once in office—then
character may actually increase through the po-
litical hierarchy. A richer analysis is needed to
illuminate the dynamics of candidate selection,
but we view our model as a useful starting
point.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
To prove Theorem 1, some preliminaries are
needed. Note that, due to the continuum of
policy locations, various statements about opti-
mal strategies will be subject to “almost all”
qualifiers; we suppress such caveats unless
essential.
LEMMA A.1: In any equilibrium, the strategic
type of a candidate wins with positive probabil-
ity when competing against the strategic type of
the other candidate.
PROOF:
Without loss of generality, it suffices to show
that for some set of Y of positive GA-measure,
A(x)  B(x) for GA-a.e. x  Y. (Because then
by concentrating mass on Y, strategic B can win
with positive probability against strategic A.)
This is immediate if GA has atoms because
A(x)  0 for any x that GA has an atom at, so
suppose that GA is atomless, hence absolutely
continuous with density gA. Let XB be the set of
all nonatomic points of GB; since GB can have
only a countable number of atoms, XB has full
GA-measure and there is a density of GB, de-
noted gB, on XB. Then, for a.e. x  XB, i(x) 
[bf(x)/bf(x) 
 (1  b)gi(x)], and there must be
a set Y  XB with the desired properties; other-
wise, 1  XB gA(x) dx 	 XB gB(x) dx  1, a
contradiction.
We now define an ex post equilibrium, which
is an equilibrium such that even if a candidate
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observed his opponent’s platform before choos-
ing his own, he would have no incentive to
deviate from his prescribed strategy.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium with cdf’s GA
and GB is an ex post equilibrium if the proba-
bility that candidate i {A, B} wins is the same
for all realizations of xA and xB in the support of
GA and GB, respectively.
Given Lemma A.1, it is straightforward that a
pair of cdf’s (GA, GB) constitutes an ex post
equilibrium strategy profile if and only if for
each i  {A, B}:
(A-1) ixi  jxj for all xi SuppGi
and xj SuppGj.
(A-2) iy  ix for all x SuppGi
and y  SuppGi.
An important consequence is that every equi-
librium is an ex post equilibrium.
LEMMA A.2: Any equilibrium is an ex post
equilibrium.
PROOF:
The following notation will be used: xi  arg
maxx
i(xi), i  maxxi(xi), xi  arg
minxi(xi), and i  minxi(xi). First, we
prove that condition (A-1) must hold in any
equilibrium. It suffices to show that for i  {A,
B}, i  i, and A  B. The latter is straight-
forward: if not, without loss of generality say A
 B, then playing xA guarantees election for A,
contradicting equilibrium mixing and Lemma
A.1. Similarly, A  B. Now, if i  i, then
xi loses at least against xj, whereas xi would win
with probability 1⁄2 against xj and moreover
against anything that xi either ties or beats, so it
is not optimal for xi to be in the support of i’s
strategy.
Condition (A-2) is also necessary in any equi-
librium because if it does not hold, then given
condition (A-1), one of the candidates can prof-
itably deviate to winning the election with prob-
ability 1, since he wins only with lower
probability in equilibrium by Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.2 implies that candidates do not
use mass points in their strategies.
LEMMA A.3: In any equilibrium, both GA and
GB are atomless.
PROOF:
Suppose that Gi has an atom on xˆ. Then
i( xˆ)  ( xˆ). Since there can be only a count-
able number of atoms, we can find a small  
0 such that
i xˆ    i xˆ     xˆ     xˆ.
If xˆ 
   Supp[Gi], condition (A-1) is
violated; if xˆ 
   Supp[Gi], condition
(A-2) is violated. Either way, Gi cannot be an
equilibrium strategy.
Accordingly, any equilibrium strategy, Gi,
has a density, gi, and by Bayes’s rule,
ix 
bfx
bfx  1  bgix .
The next lemma shows that the support of a
candidate’s strategy must be in an interval con-
taining the median voter’s ideal policy.
LEMMA A.4: In any equilibrium, for i  {A,
B}, Supp[Gi] is an interval that contains m.
PROOF:
First we argue that the support is an interval.
Suppose not for player i. Then there exist x 
y  z such that gi(x)  0, gi(y)  0, and gi(z) 
0. This implies that i(x) 	 1, i(y)  1, and
i(z) 	 1. If y 
 m, it follows that i(y) 
i(z); if y  m, then i(y)  i(x). Either case
contradicts condition (A-2) for an ex post
equilibrium.
Next, we show that the interval must contain
m. If it didn’t, without loss of generality say it is
[l, h] with h 	 m, then i(m)  1, hence for any
x  [l, h],
im    m  ix  x  ix,
contradicting condition (A-2) for an ex post
equilibrium.
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The lemmata above in hand, we can now
proceed with the proof of Theorem 1.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
(Existence) We first prove that both players
playing G* is an ex post equilibrium for some
constant *. It is easy to verify that given G*,
the posterior belief is the following function *
for both candidates (so we drop the superscripts
indexing candidates):
* x  
*  ( x)

if g*(x) 0
1 if g*(x) 0
.
Accordingly,
 x*  * x   x
 * if g*x 0
  x if g*x 0
.
Noting from (2) that g*(x)  0 requires * 
(x) 
 , one sees that conditions (A-1) and
(A-2) for an ex post equilibrium are indeed
satisfied. It remains only to verify that there is a
constant * which makes g* a density. Since
g*(x)
 0 for all x X, we need only check that
X g*(x) dx  1 for some *.
Define
 x,   max0, bf(x)1 b    (x) 1
so that g*(x)  (x, *). We now prove that
there is a unique constant * such that X (x,
*) dx  1. First, observe that  is continuous
in . Next, note that if  
  
 (m), then  
  (x) for all x  X; hence (x, )  0 for
all x  X and X (x, ) dx  0 	 1. On the
other hand, for   (m) and small   0,

X
x, m dx 
 
m 
m
 
x, m dx
 
m 
m
 
max0, bf(x)1 b  (m)(x) 1 dx
	
bf(m)
1  b 
m 
m
  
(m)  (x) dx  2
	
bfm
1  b 
m 
m
  
12(m)(x m)2
dx 2
	 ,
where the penultimate line follows from
(m)  u1(m, m)  0 and Taylor expansion,
and the last line from the fact that (m) 
u11(m, m)  0. By the Intermediate Value The-
orem, there is a value of , call it *  ((m),
(m) 
 ), which satisfies X (x, *) dx  1.
It is straightforward that there cannot be any
other value of  such that X (x, ) dx  1,
since (x, ) is strictly decreasing in  for any
x such that (x, )  0.
(Uniqueness) Now we prove that both play-
ers playing G* is the unique equilibrium. De-
note the support of G* by [l*, h*]  {m}.
Suppose there is another (necessarily ex post,
by Lemma A.2) equilibrium where a candidate
i plays Gi  G*. By Lemmas A.3 and A.4, Gi
has a density gi with support [l, h] {m}. Since
Gi  G*, there must be some nondegenerate
interval, Y  [l, h], such that gi(x)  g*(x) for
all x Y. This implies that i(x) 	 *(x) for all
x  Y, and Lemma A.2 then implies i(x) 	
*(x) for all x  [l, h]. Consequently,
(A-3) gi x  g* x for all x l, h.
Since gi and g* are both densities, either l  l*
or h 	 h* (or both). Suppose l  l* (the argu-
ment is analogous for h 	 h*). By its construc-
tion, g*(x)  0 for all x in a small neighborhood
of l. A contradiction ensues with (A-3) if we
show that gi(x) 3 0 as x 3 l. To prove this,
observe that i(x)  1 for all x 	 l, and hence
i(xi)   
 (x) for all x 	 l. By condition
(A-2), and using Bayes’s rule, it must be that for
any   0, there is a   0 such that gi(x) 	 
for all x  (l, l 
 ).
PROOF OF FACT 5:
Observe that for any x  Supp[G*], when
  ,
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g* x 
bf x
1  b  *  ( x)  1

bfx
1  b 

1
*


(x)

 1
	
bfx
1  b  *  1 .
The proof is completed by noting from (2)
that (/*) 3 (1/b) as  3 .
PROOF OF FACT 6:
Let the value *f refer to the utility generated
by f and *h refer to that generated by h. Since
[/*  (x)]  1 is decreasing as x moves
away from the median, m, h(x)  f(x), and
[/*  (x)]  1 are positively correlated. If
the support of g* is the whole policy space,
 bh x  f x1  b  *f   x)  1 dx
  bhx fx1 b dx
	   *f (x) 1 dx 0
and thus

x
bh x
1  b  *f  ( x)  1 dx  1.
It follows that *h  *f.
PROOF OF FACT 7:
For the case of b 3 1, inspection of (2)
shows that * increases in b without bound.
Since Supp(g*)  {x 
 (x) 
 *}, as *
increases, the support shrinks to {m}. (Note that
m is always in the support; see Lemma A.4.)
As b3 0, inspection of (2) shows that *3
(m). Thus, indeed Supp(g*)3 {x(x) 
  

(m)}. To see that G* converges in distribution
to point-mass on m, observe that for as b 3 0,
for any   0, both 0m max{0, [bf(x)/1 
b](/*  (x))  1]} dx 3 0 and m
1
max{0, [bf( x)/1  b][(/*  ( x))  1]}
dx 3 0.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
Throughout, assume that u is convex, i.e.,
2u(0, 1) 	 u(1, 1) 
 u(1, 1).
Step 1: First, we show that a Centrist Domi-
nant equilibrium does not exist. As shorthand,
let z  bf0 
 1  b. In a Centrist Dominant
equilibrium, since both primary voters and the
general election voter (strictly) prefer centrists
to extremists, strategic candidates must choose
the centrist platform, 0, with probability one,
i.e., g0  1. Thus, the Bayes update about
character given platform 0 is (0)  (bf0/z),
whereas given platform 1 or 1 it is (1) 
(1)  1. Note that given this behavior, the
probability that a party’s nominee is extreme is
(1  z)2, i.e., it is the probability that both of the
party’s candidates have character and extreme
position. The probability that a party’s nominee
is centrist is 1  (1  z)2.
We argue that party R’s voter strictly prefers to
nominate an extreme candidate with platform 1
rather than a centrist, which contradicts equilib-
rium behavior. From the perspective of the R
party primary voter, if she nominates a centrist
candidate, the general election winner will be
centrist, and regardless of which party the gen-
eral election winner is from, her utility from that
candidate is u(0, 1) 
 (bf0/z), where we use the
fact that the Bayes update about character from
centrist candidates of both parties is the same.
On the other hand, if she nominates an extreme
candidate from her party (if one exists, which is
a positive probability event), there are two pos-
sibilities: either party L’s nominee is extreme
(platform  1), which has probability (1  z)2;
or party L’s nominee is centrist, which has
probability 1  (1  z)2. In the first case, each
of the two extreme nominees wins with proba-
bility 1⁄2 ;18 in the second case, the centrist from
18 Strictly speaking, the general election voter is indif-
ferent between nominees with platforms 1 and 1, and need
not necessarily randomize uniformly across them. The en-
suing argument, however, extends to cover this case be-
cause if the randomization favors 1 over 1 to such an
extent that the strategic candidate from party R does not
have an incentive to deviate to platform 1, then a strategic
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L wins with certainty. Thus, the R primary vot-
er’s expected utility from nominating an ex-
tremist is
1
2 1  z
2u1, 1    u1, 1 
 1 1 z2u(0, 1)  bf0z .
Therefore, the primary voter has a profitable
deviation to nominating an extremist over a
centrist if the expression above is strictly greater
that the utility from nominating a centrist, u(0,
1) 
 (bf0/z). Some algebra reveals that this is
equivalent to
u0, 1 
1
2 u1, 1 u1, 1 
1 b
z
,
which is true since u is convex.
Step 2: Next, we show that the set of param-
eters for which a General Election Indifference
equilibrium exists contains an open set of pos-
itive Lebesgue measure. To construct such an
equilibrium, we need indifference between cen-
trists and extremists of the general election
voter; strict preference for extremists over cen-
trists for party voters; and indifference between
platforms for the strategic candidates. Assume
that party voters randomize equally over two
candidates with the same platform. We consider
only party R; by symmetry, the logic extends to
party L. Let z0  bf0 
 (1  b)g0.
For the general election voter to be indiffer-
ent between centrists and extremists, we must
have
u0, 0  
bf0
z
 u0, 1  
b1  f0 
1  z
or
(A-4)
u0, 0  u1, 0  b(1  f0)1  z  bf0z  .
The left-hand side of (A-4) is strictly pos-
itive. The right-hand side is continuous and
strictly increasing in z, where z can range
from bf0 (if g0  0) to bf0 
 (1  b) (if g0 
1). It can be verified that the right-hand side
is strictly negative if z  bf0 and strictly
positive but less than (1  b/1  b 
 bf0)
if z  bf0 
 (1  b). Thus, so long as
u(0, 0)  u(0, 1) 	 (1  b), there is a
unique solution z to (A-4). Note that the so-
lution z pins down g0, i.e., the behavior of
strategic candidates.
Suppose that if faced with two nominees with
platforms 1 and 1, the general election voter
randomizes uniformly over the two; if faced
with one centrist and one extremist, she votes
for the extremist with probability p. Then, the
probability that a candidate from party R wins
the party nomination and the general election
with platform 0 is 1⁄2 z(1⁄2 z2 
 (1  z2)(1  p)),
where 1⁄2 z is the probability that the other can-
didate within the party is also a centrist, and z2
is the probability that the nominee from the
other party, L, is a centrist. Similarly, the prob-
ability of winning with platform 1 is (z 

1⁄2 (1  z))(pz2 
 (1  z2)1⁄2 ). These two prob-
abilities of winning must be equal for strategic
candidates to randomize between platforms,
which solves for p  1⁄2 [1  (1/z 
 z2)].
Plainly, p 	 1⁄2 , and moreover, for p 
 0
requires that z 
 z2 
 1, or z 
 (5  1/2).
This places a restriction on the set of parameters
(recall that z must solve (A-4)), but clearly there
is an open and positive measure set of parame-
ters for which z 
 (5  1/2).
It remains only to verify that the R primary
voter strictly prefers a candidate with platform 1
to one with platform 0. Computing the proba-
bilities of various events, this incentive compat-
ibility constraint can be written as
u(0, 1)   bf0z   z2  1  z21  p
 u(1, 1)  b(1 f0)1 z 1 z2p
 u(1, 1)  b(1 f0)1 z 12 (1 z2) z2p
 u(0, 1)  bf0z z21 pcandidate from party L will have an incentive to deviate toplatform 1.
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 u(1, 1)  b(1 f0)1 z  12 1 z2.
Substituting p  1⁄2 [1  (1/z 
 z2)] and the
symmetry assumption u(1, 0)  u(1, 0) into
the inequality above, tedious but straightfor-
ward simplification shows that the inequality
above is equivalent to
u0, 1  u1, 1 u0, 0 u1, 0
 u0, 0 u0, 1 u1, 1
 u0, 1
z
1 z2 .
Since z 
 1  z2 (because p 
 0), the
inequality above holds if
u0, 0  u1, 0  u1, 1  u0, 1
 u0, 1 u1, 1 u0, 0 u1, 0,
which is equivalent to
u1, 1  u1, 1 2u0, 1
 2u0, 0 u1, 0,
which holds because u is convex and u(0, 0 
u(1, 0).
Step 3: To show that a Naive Policy Prefer-
ence equilibrium exists for an open parameter
set of positive measure, one proceeds similarly
to the logic of Step 2, but using the appropriate
equilibrium conditions: primary voters strictly
prefer party extremists over centrists, the gen-
eral election voter strictly prefers centrists over
extremists, and strategic candidates randomize
over the center platform and their party ex-
treme. We omit the argument to conserve space;
details are available from the authors.
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